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Making
Bosnia Work, by Charles G. Boyd, © Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1998.
"The
Dayton Accord is a bold attempt to create a nation in the face of ethnic
hatred and fear, and it just may succeed-but only if U.S. troops stay and
the coalition overseeing the peace puts the security of Muslims, Serbs,
and Croats before their integration. For now, each group feels safe only
with their own kind, and their self-created partition should be allowed
to stand while the trauma of war fades. Material need and the desire for
profit may bring the three peoples together in time. Meanwhile, the international
community must rectify the gross disparity between the reconstruction aid
and military supplies flowing to the Muslims and the crumbs and punitive
attitude that are the Serbs' lot."
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/index/issues/journals/facontents/1-2-98.html
Q:
Is a continued stay of U.S. troops in Bosnia in the national interest?
No.
U.S. military readiness is being weakened by efforts to support a fictional
nation.
By Gary
Dempsey, © CATO Today's Commentary, 03/02/99
"That's
not to say that Dayton hasn't led to any success. The fighting has stopped,
and so far more than 3,600 pieces of heavy weaponry have been removed.
But those few successes reveal Dayton for what it really is: a complicated
cease-fire, not a solution to Bosnia's long-term problems. The country
still is deeply fractured, divided into two semiautonomous 'entities' separated
by a monstrosity called the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. One entity, the
Serb Republic, now almost is entirely Serb. The other, the Muslim-Croat
Federation, is made up of rival enclaves that maintain a tense coexistence.
Nearly 90 percent of the Serbs who lived in the Muslim-Croat Federation
before 1992 were expelled or have left.
The prospect
for ethnic reintegration is not promising. By the end of 1997, only 19
percent of Bosnia's 2.3 million refugees and displaced persons had returned
home. Moreover, the total number of returnees in 1998 is expected to be
only 11 percent of that of 1997. Even more telling, during the last three
years only 55,000 Bosnians have returned to areas where they would be in
the minority. At the same time, 80,000 Bosnians have moved from areas where
they were in the minority to areas where they would be in the majority.
That means there are 25,000 fewer Bosnians living in integrated communities
today than when Dayton was signed three years ago. Moreover, 85 percent
of Bosnians recently polled still say they will not vote for a candidate
from another ethnic group."
http://www.cato.org/dailys/03-02-99.html
See also:
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-327es.html
Imposing
Perverted Democracy in Bosnia, By Ted Galen Carpenter,
©
CATO Today's Commentary, 03/13/99
"Rather
than admit failure, the would-be nation builders, led by 'High Representative'
Carlos Westendorp, are now resorting to tactics that make a mockery of
any reasonable concept of democracy. The latest outrage was Westendorp's
removal of Nikola Poplasen as president of the Bosnian Serb republic –
one of the two subnational political entities that make up the convoluted
Bosnian state. Last September voters dared to elect the radical nationalist
Poplasen over the candidate preferred by the Western powers, even though
it meant spurning offers of lucrative financial aid for the hard-pressed
Serb republic. The offense that led to Poplasen's dismissal was his refusal
to reappoint the incumbent prime minister, Milorad Dodik, favored by Westendorp
and the Western governments."
A European
"New Deal" For The Balkans, By Benn Steil and Susan L. Woodward, ©
Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 1998.
"Peace
in the Balkans depends on economic stability and prosperity for all. To
overcome the legacies of failed economic reforms and ethnic strife, southeastern
Europe needs nothing short of a European 'New Deal.' Sound money and free
trade can take root in the Balkans only if the EU expands the euro and
its trade arrangements to the region promptly, with no strings attached.
But the EU's current approach, which attaches conditions to membership
in its elite clubs, falls far short."
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/index/issues/journals/facontents/11-12-99.html
Making
Peace with the Guilty, By Charles G. Boyd, © Foreign Affairs,
Sept/Oct 1995.
"The
difference between the factions in Bosnia is not morality, as the Bosnian
Muslims and Western press insist, but power and opportunity. All have the
same goal: to avoid living as a minority. All have committed crimes against
other ethnic groups. Despite its claims of neutrality and preaching against
military solutions, the United States has favored the Bosnian Muslims,
keeping silent as they launched offensives from U.N.-guarded safe areas.
Since air strikes cannot resolve the conflict, the United States must discourage
violence by all sides and let Russia-the one country Serbs trust-take the
lead in negotiations."
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/index/issues/journals/facontents/9-10-95.html
Bosnia's
Foreign Elections Unwise and Dangerous, By Jan Oberg,
©
TFF PressInfo 25, 09/10/97.
"Symbolic
or shallow democracy will be the only outcome when foreigners impose elections
under extremely adverse circumstances as is the case in Dayton-Bosnia.
They could even be dangerous in their consequences because some local results
are likely to be implemented by force. One increasingly wonders whether
the international community is in Bosnia for the sake of the people living
there or to uphold an illusory image of itself as effective post-Cold War
conflict-'managers' – says TFF's director, Jan Oberg who has followed the
situation since February 1992 as head of the foundation's conflict-mitigation
team to all parts of former Yugoslavia."
http://www.transnational.org/pressinf/pf25.html
The
Exit Strategy Delusion, By Gideon Rose, © Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb
1998.
"Despite
disagreements over troops in Bosnia, all sides want an exit strategy. That
concept, however, dating back only to the ignominious U.S. withdrawal from
Somalia, has nothing to do with military requirements and everything to
do with post-Cold War politics. Exit strategies harm a mission's chances
of success, and had they been required the United States would not have
defended the armistice after the Korean War, kept the peace on the Sinai
Peninsula after Camp David, or undertaken NATO. The real question is not
when American troops will be out, but why they are going in."
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/index/issues/journals/facontents/1-2-98.html
Holbrooke
Horror: The U.S. Peace Plan for Bosnia, By Ted Galen Carpenter, ©
Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 37 October 27, 1995
"The
terms of the emerging peace accord to end the war in Bosnia are a blueprint
for disaster. Washington foolishly insists on maintaining the fiction of
a united Bosnian state while accepting a de facto partition. Renewed fighting
is highly probable when the Serb self-governing "entity" attempts to secede
and merge with Serbia and the Muslim-dominated government tries to assert
Bosnia's sovereignty. Indeed, a clash between Muslim and Croat forces is
also possible, since any Muslim-Croat cooperation has been a matter of
expediency. To enforce such an inherently unworkable settlement would be
to recklessly put American treasure and lives at risk."
http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-037.html
The
Balkan Thicket, Prepared by Jonathan G. Clarke, © The Cato Institute
"The
most regrettable aspect of the Bosnian tragedy was that it was to a great
extent avoidable. Despite historical and ethnic complexity, the essential
elements of the Bosnian conflict were not hard to understand. They reflected
a wish on the parts of the peoples of the constituent republics of the
former Yugoslavia to form new states in which Slovenes, Croats, Serbs,
Muslims, and Macedonians, respectively, would dominate the organs of government."
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-44.html
The
Troubled History of Partition, By Radha Kumar, © Foreign Affairs,
Jan/Feb 1997.
"The
Dayton accord reached in November 1995 was something historically familiar:
a partition agreement. As in Bosnia today, partition has usually arisen
not as a means of national self-determination but as a way for great powers
to 'divide and quit.' Often described as the only workable solution to
ethnic feuding, partitions have in fact generally fomented violence and
required further international intervention. Similar conditions ensure
that Bosnia will turn into a policy of divide and be forced to stay. Had
outside powers worked from the beginning to reintegrate the fractured country,
Bosnia, the Balkans, and Europe might have had a more durable resolution.
The Dayton agreement should evoke memories not of Munich but of Cyprus."
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/index/issues/journals/facontents/1-2-97.html
In
Bosnia, 'Peacekeeping' Forces Will Be 'Peacemakers'; Diplomacy: Bosnia
has never been a nation and has no specific cultural identity. Why are
we intent on preserving this Balkan no man's land? By Henry A. Kissinger,
Opinion Page, © The Times, 5/16/1993.
"Rarely
has a President been faced with decisions involving the Hobson's choice
presented to Bill Clinton over Bosnia. If the Bosnian Serbs reject the
Vance-Owen plan, he is being urged to bring them into line by military
action, probably bombing. If they accept the plan, he seems committed to
contributing 20,000 U.S. troops to a peacekeeping force of more than 60,000.
And he may well wind up being obliged to take both steps."
Search
the Los Angeles Times Archives: http://www.latimes.com/archives/
ID: 0930050991
Did
U.S. Concern for Bosnia Justify Iran Arms Pipeline? © Los Angeles
Times, Opinion, 4/7/1996.
"For
four long years the war in Bosnia defied Big Power fiddling, arm-twisting
and diplomatic initiatives, finally collapsing last fall because the combatants
simply ran out of gas. Had the Americans and Europeans been able to foresee
that outcome, some considerable missteps might not have been made, including
the Clinton administration's decision to wink at Iranian arms shipments
to the Muslim-led Bosnian government despite a U.N. arms embargo."
Search
the Los Angeles Times Archives: http://www.latimes.com/archives/
ID: 0960030874
The
domino Theory Reborn: Clinton's Bosnia Intervention and the "wider war"
thesis, By Ted Galen Carpenter, © Cato Foreign Policy Briefing
No. 42 , 08/15/96
"President
Clinton's assertion that the U.S.-led NATO mission in Bosnia is essential
to prevent a wider European war is erroneous. Two of the wider war scenarios
– Serbia as a runaway expansionist power like Nazi Germany and the prospect
that the Bosnian conflict could ignite a continental conflagration just
as a Balkan incident sparked World War I – are so far-fetched that they
should be dismissed out of hand...The wider war thesis is merely a refurbished
domino theory. Not every armed conflict in Europe is destined to lead to
a massive war that would affect important American security interests."
http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-042.html
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©2000 SANE, Inc. For free and fair use only.
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